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Resumo
Neste artigo, o objetivo é rever os testes empíricos existentes para o grau de competição no setor bancário 
brasileiro, assim como propor algumas alternativas. Após a descrição do ambiente institucional do sistema 
bancário brasileiro, os testes sobre a competição, presentes na literatura, foram revisados, começando com 
o proposto por Panzar e Rosse (1987). A principal conclusão que pode ser extraída desta análise é que o 
mercado não aparenta estar em equilíbrio de longo prazo, indicando que o mercado não é regido por 
condições de colusão perfeita. O passo seguinte foi tentar uma nova metodolodia aplicada por Moreno, 
Martínez e Ruiz (2006) para o mercado bancário espanhol. Nesta metodologia, em que a hipótese de 
igualdade dos parâmetros de conduta entre empresas e ao longo do tempo é relaxada, os resultados 
indicam que, para algumas empresas e em alguns instantes do tempo, uma conduta coo-perativa está 
presente. 
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to review some of the existing tests for competition in Brazilian banking, as well as 
to propose an alternative. After the description of the institutional setting of the Brazilian Banking system 
on this period, the competition tests on the literature were reviewed, beginning with the test proposed 
by Panzar and Rosse (1987). The market does not seem to be in long-run equilibrium, implying only the 
market does not seem to find itself in collusive outcome. The next step was to try a new methodology, 
applied by Moreno, Martínez and Ruiz (2006) for the Spanish banking market. On this methodology, in 
which the assumption of equality of conduct parameters between firms and time periods is relaxed, the 
results indicate that, for some firms and in some time periods, a cooperative conduct in fact is present.
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1 Introduction
Since the Real Stabilization Plan of July 1994, one of the most important research 
questions facing the academic community is about the interest rate charged by 
the bakning system. As of March 2010, from an interest rate of about 8.75% per 
annum on Brazilian Treasury bonds, the lending interest rate reaches from 30.45% 
p.a. in the case of Working Capital Loans, to 161.05% p.a. in the case of overdraft 
accounts to individuals. Furthermore, the data also show the Brazilian economy is 
characterized by a low degree of financial intermadiation. According to Belaisch 
(2003), the Brazilian banking system is surprisingly small, compared to industria-
lized economies. The importance of these stylized facts was not left unattended 
of the professional academic community in Brazil, the literature on this subject is 
growing steadily, and can be categorized on three strands. The first one emphasi-
zes the role of institutional elements on the lending rates' spread over the risk-free 
rates. Some of the most important elements singled out for analysis are:
•  The role the tax code currently plays on the intermediation spread between 
lending and borrowing. On this subject, Cardoso and Koyama (2000) report 
on taxes and contributions currently levied on the lending operations by banks, 
which were then responsible for approximately 17,1% of the lending rate on a 
two month lending operation for a company. 
•  The reduced creditor protection offered by Brazilian law, associated with the 
high levels of non-performing credits on the portfolios of banks. The same study 
of Cardoso and Koyama (2000) also indicates the high amount of non-perfor-
ming loans increases significantly the spread, which can only be reduced by 
increased credit information and improvements on creditors' rights. This line 
of reasoning is also present on papers by Costa (2004) and Costa and Nakane 
(2004). 
The second line of study enphasizes efficiency aspects of the banking sector. In 
doing so, they investigate the role some factors play on technical efficiency – un-
derstood as the distance from an hypothetical efficient technical frontier – of 
Brazilian banking sector. A subsidiary line of research is preocuppied with potential 
productivity differences between private and state-owned banks. Some papers are 
Nakane (1999) and Silva and Jorge Neto (2002). Belaisch (2003) indicates that 
operating expenses account for about 90% of operating income in Brazil, thirty 
percentage points above the figure recorded for the other large Latin American 
countries.
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Finally, the last line of research enphasizes the role of competition on the deter-
mination of spreads. On this subject, Belaisch (2003)used a panel database to 
conclude that the behavior of a sample of Brazilian banks is not consistent with a 
competitive market structure. Other important papers on the subject are Nakane 
(2001, 2004), and Petterini and Jorge Neto (2003), which use econometric te-
chniques to determine if the behavior of Brazilian banks is consistent with some 
alternative competition structures.
Petterini and Jorge Neto (2003) use a version of the model by Jaumandreu and 
Lorences (2002), and conclude for the rejection of the collusive hypothesis on the 
Brazilian banking industry. A two step approach was used, in which are estimated 
demand equations in a first step in order to obtain the relevant own and cross price 
elasticities. Given those elasticities, the results corresponding to differing equilibria 
are computed and a model selection test statistic is used for selecting the behavior 
not rejected by the evidence presented by the data.
Nakane (2001) uses the methodology presented in Bresnahan (1982) and Lau 
(1982) to estimate the percentage response of the market supply of loans to a gi-
ven percentage change on the loan supply of a given bank. The estimated value by 
Nakane (2001) is significantly different from zero, indicating the rejection of the 
perfect competition hypothesis. However, the small magnitude of the coefficient, 
combined with the results of statistical tests, also point out to the rejection of the 
collusion hypothesis.
Using the Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology, Belaisch (2003) finds evidence 
of a non-competitive market strutucture. Araújo et al. (2005) also use this metho-
dology as a stepping stone on their analysis of the effects of market concentration 
on competition, and also report results consistent with Belaisch's (2003). All these 
results do have some similarities, for in all of them the hypotheses of a behavior 
consistent with either extreme of the taxonomy of market strutuctures – perfect 
competition or monopoly – is rejected by the data. Even though this result does 
shed some light on the matter, it still does not give evidence on how Brazilian banks 
compete.
Given this literature, the aim of this paper is to try to establish some characteristics 
of how Brazilian banks compete, in order to better direct the theoretical efforts to 
explain Brazilian banking competition. Before that, some historical and institutional 
characteristics of the Brazilian banking system must be highlighted. This will be 
detailed on the following section.
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2 History and Institutional Characteristics of the Brazilian Banking Sector
In order to better understand the characteristics of the Brazilian banking system 
one must begin by highlighting the effects of the high inflation environment that 
was a fixture of the Brazilian economy from the beginning of the eighties to the 
successful stabilization plan (Real Plan) in 1994.1 According to Loyola et al. (2003), 
the most important characteristics, were:
•  Overbranching: the race for deposits in the period of high inflation entailed the 
opening of a large number of branches, many of which were not profitable after 
the Real Plan. 
•  Overbanking: the high inflation period also witnessed the opening of a large 
number of banking institutions, reaching 250 in 1993, from 121 in 1987. 
•  Collapse of the long-run credit market: given the high level and variability of 
the inflation rates, Brazilian banks refrained from their classical functions of 
channeling credit and financial intermediation. 
•  High level of investment of information technology and clearing of payments, 
given the need for a speedy clearing of outstanding inter-bank balances. 
After the Real Plan, the sudden decrease on the inflation rates, by reducing the 
revenues associated with the management of the short-run deposits, exposed some 
of the operational problems of these institutions. The most affected group was 
composed of state owned banks, and specially the ones owned by subnational go-
vernments, which were used as quasi monetary authorities by the state governors,2 
as well as a source of political benefits for the incumbent political party. On the 
second half of the nineties, these practicies had to end, exposing the weak operatio-
nal performance of such banks. This led to the restructuring of the sector, helped 
by a program designed by the Federal Government (PROES).3
1 One of the most interesting characteristics of the Brazilian inflationary process was the lack of an 
overt process of dollarization, as in the other Latin American countries during the same period. 
The agents responded to the high inflation environment by moving their resources to the banking 
system, which developed a large number of financial instruments intended to protect the real 
value of money holdings. Despite being interesting, this will not be our aim on this paper, except 
where it provides a backdrop for some institutional characteristics of the system.
2 Before the Stabilization Plan, the state governors used to finance their expenditures through 
their banks, which regularly turned insolvent. However, the Federal Government usually ended 
up bailing out these banks, warranting their use as independent monetary authorities.
3 For its portuguese name, Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público na Atividade 
Bancária.
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However, not only the state owned banks found themselves with difficulties after 
the decrease in inflation rates. For the private owned banks, the federal government 
also set up a program to ease the restructuring of such banks, denoted PROER.4 
This program, which made available credit lines for the prospective buyers and allo-
wed the break-up of the troubled banks into two parts,5 enabled a relatively quick 
turnover of the banks affected by the disinflation process. The following table gives 
some details on the structure and evolution of the banking system:
Table 1 – Brazilian Banking Industry – Selected Indicators
 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Public  15  15  15  14  14  13  13  12 
Private-Domestic  81  76  78  82  82  81  77  78 
Private-Foreign 
Participation  14  11  10  10  8  9  10  7 
Private-Foreign 
Control  75  67  63  59  57  57  59  63 
Total Private  170  154  151  151  147  147  146  148 
Grand Total  185  169  166  165  161  160  159  160 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
As regards prices of the services offered by the Brazilian Banking System, in January 
2010, the spreads over the basic were about 120 to 140 percentage points in the 
case of overdraft accounts, to less than 40 percentage points for personal credit 
lines and 20 p.p. to auto credit. For businesses, the spreads seem to be more vola-
tile, ranging from 50 p.p. in discounts of trade notes to less than 10 p.p. in vendor 
credit. The next step in the analysis is to investigate the nature of the competition 
on the Brazilian Banking System.
3 Competition on Brazilian Banking System
After discussing the institutional characteristics of the Brazilian Banking Sector on 
the previous one, the empirical evaluation of the behavior of the system is carried 
out. In order to carry out such a challenge, a database from quarterly balance sheet 
data from the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 20056 was assem-
4 In Portuguese, Programa de Estímulo à Reestruturação e ao Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro 
Nacional.
5 The troubled banks were split into two parts. One included the non-performing assets, and was 
handed over to the Central Bank for recovery of such credits and repayment to the shareholders 
and some creditors. The second part, which included the portfolio of "good'' credits and the 
deposits, was to be auctioned off.
6 The data was obtained from the website of the Brazilian Central bank: <http://www.bcb.gov.br/
Fis/Top50/Port/default-i.asp?idioma=I&id=50top>.
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bled. For each of the banks, data on assets, liabilities and net profit statement was 
collected, and the relevant variables for the econometric analysis that follows are 
constructed. The definition of the variables is presented below, and the descriptive 
statistics are presented on the Appendix A.
Table 2 – Variable Definitions
Variable 
Code 
Meaning Construction - Numbers refer to account codes at 
the COSIF system 
v7 Total Assets 10000007 (+) and 20000004 (+) 
v13  Loans and Leases - Total 16000001 (+), 16900008 (-), 17000000 (+) and 
17900007 (-) 
v14  Provision for Non-Performing 16900008 (+), 17900007 (+) 
v17  Leased Assets 23000001 (+) 
v18  Fixed Assets 20000004 (+), 23000001 (-) 
p7  Total Liabilities 40000008 (+), 50000005 (+) 
p13  Total Deposits 41000007 (+) 
p18  Liabilities on Loans 46000002 (+) 
d13  Total Deposits 41000007 (+) 
l7  Service Charges 71700009 (+) and 71970004 (+) 
l8  Payroll Expenses 
81718005 (+), 81727003 (+), 81730007 (+), 
81733004 (+), 81736001 (+), 81737000 (+), 
81990201 (+) 
l9  Overhead 
81703003 (+), 81706000 (+), 81709007 (+), 
81712001 (+), 81715008 (+), 81721009 (+), 
81724006 (+), 81739008 (+), 81742002 (+), 
81745009 (+), 81748006 (+), 81751000 (+), 
81754007 (+), 81757004 (+), 81760008 (+), 
81763005 (+), 81766002 (+), 81772003 (+), 
81775000 (+), 81777008 (+), 81781001 (+), 
81799000 (+), 81810006 (+), 81820003 (+) and 
81990304 (+) 
l10  Tax Expenses 81769009 (+), 81925001 (+), 81930003 (+), 
81933000 (+) and 81990902 (+) 
l12  Other Operating Revenues 71930006 (+), 71975009 (+), 71985006 (+), 71990950 (+), 71990998 (+) and 71999009 (+) 
l13  Other Operating Expenses 
81830990 (+), 81910009 (+), 81920006 (+), 
81936007 (+), 81952005 (+), 81965009 (+), 
81975006 (+), 81985003 (+), 81990108 (+) and 
81999006 (+) 
l15  Non-Operating Income 73000006 (+) and 83000003 (+) 
l20  Number of Workers  
l21  Number of Branches  
r7  Loans and Leases (Revenues) 
71100001 (+), 71200004 (+), 71920009 (+), 
71925004 (+), 71950000 (+), 71980001 (+), 
81940000 (+), 81945005 (+) and 81950007 (+) 
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Variable 
Code 
Meaning Construction - Numbers refer to account codes at 
the COSIF system 
r8 Repo-Resell (Revenues) 
71400000 (+), 71500003 (+), 71580009 (-), 
71940003 (+), 71945008 (+), 71947006 (+), 
71990053 (+), 71990101 (+), 71990156 (+), 
71990204 (+), 71990709 (+), 81500000 (+), 
81550005 (-), 81830055 (+), 81830103 (+), 
81830158 (+), 81830206 (+) and 81830701 (+) 
r9 Derivative Financial Instruments (Revenues) 71580009 (+), 81550005 (+), 71990266 (+) and 
81830268 (+) 
r10 Foreign Exchange (Revenues) 71300007 (+) and 81400007 (+) (if positive) 
r11 Required Deposits (Revenues) 71955005 (+), 71960007 (+), 71965002 (+), 
71990125 (+) and 81830127 (+) 
r12 Deposits, Acceptances and Repo-Repurchases 
(Expenses) 
81100008 (+) and 81980008 (+) 
r13 Borrowing (Expenses) 81200001 (+) and 81960004 (+) 
r14 Lease (Expenses) 71990503 (+), 81300004 (+), 81830505 (+) and 
81830550 (+) 
r15 Exchange Rate Operations (Expenses) 71300007 (+) and 81400007 (+) (if negative) 
r16  Allowance for Bad Credits 
71990307 (+), 71990352 (+), 71990400 (+), 
71990606 (+), 81830309 (+), 81830354 (+), 
81830402 (+) and 81830608 (+) 
TOTALit Total Number of Branches in the System (Per Quarter) 
AGNit  Share of Total Number of Branches l21/TOTALit 
CRDit  Risk on Financial Intermediation v13/(d13 + p18) 
W1it  Payments to the Labor Force (-l8/l20) 
RDEPit  Remuneration to deposits ((-1)*(r12 + r13 + r14 + r15 + l13))/(p7 + p13) 
W3it  Remuneration fo Physical Capital (-l9)/(v17+v18) 
RTit  Total Revenue (r7+r8+r9+r10+r11+l7+l12+l15) 
DEPSit  Total Deposits (p7+p13) 
Yit  GDP at Market Prices (Source:IPEA)  
Qit  Total Assets v7 
Pit Ratio of Annual Interest Income to Total Assets (r7+r8+r9+r10+r11)/v7 
Zit Interbank Rate - Per Quarter (Source: IPEA and transformation to per quarter) 
NPit Share of Non-Performing Assets (-1)*(v14/v7) 
QUALit Measure of Quality of services l20/l21 
Cit Total Costs 
(-1)*(l8+l9 + l10 + l13 + r12 + r13 + r14 + 
r15+ r16) 
CREDSit Total Credits v8 + v9 + v10 + v13 + v15 
RCREDit Remuneration to credits (r7 + r8 + r9 + r10 + r11 + l7 + l12)/CREDSit 
SHAREit Market Share in Credits  
CR3it Sum of the three largest market shares  
ASSEMPit Assets per Employee v7/l20 
SU1it 
Share of Remuneration of Employees in Total 
Cost 
(-1)*(l8)/Cit 
SU2it 
Share of Remuneration of Physical Capital in 
Total Cost 
 (-1)*(l9)/Cit 
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A definite conclusion on how Brazilian banks compete must require answers to 
some questions before any econometric test is carried out. One of the most impor-
tant questions is about the definition of the relevant variables, since there is some 
disagreement on what consititute inputs and outputs of the banking activity. For 
instance, in some papers the deposits are considered as an input for the produc-
tion of the output – as in the "Monti-Klein'' model of financial intermediation.7 
In others, both credits and deposits are services to be considered as outputs to be 
offered in joint production. In order to consider all possibilities, we will adopt an 
ecletic approach, allowing both possibilities.8
As for the methodological approaches followed here, we chose options based on 
the estimation of conduct parameter – either directly or as a measure that can bem 
mapped in the conduct parameter such as Panzar and Rosse (1987) . Alternative 
approaches, such as of the non-nested hypothesis favored by Nevo (1998) are not 
possible because of the lack of avaliable data.
3.1 The Panzar-Rosse Methodology
For analyzing Brazilian banking competition, the first econometric test is based on 
the general methodology proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) for what they call 
"monopoly equilibrium''. On that paper, they start from the comparative statics of 
a firm's equilibrium under alternative competition assumptions. From that point 
on, they derive conclusions on the sum of the elasticities of the total revenue with 
respect to the prices of each of the productive factors, which they denote ψ and 
the following literature calls the "Statistic H of Panzar and Rosse''. The conclusions 
are stated as follows:
•  Theorem 1 (Panzar and Rosse, 1987, p. 445): "The sum of the factor price elas-
ticities of a monopolist's reduced form revenue equation9 must be nonpositive.'' 
(thus, ψ ≤ 0). 
•  Proposition 1 (Panzar and Rosse, 1987, p. 451): "In symmetric Chamberlinian 
equilibrium, the sum of the elasticities of firm's reduced form revenues with 
respect to factor prices is less than or equal to unity.'' (thus, ψ ≤ 1). 
7 It is important to notice, though, the assumption of deposits as an independent product does not 
imply the deposits of an individual bank cannot be used to increase the supply of an individual 
bank. The deposits, even though they are considered a service provided to its customers, are used 
to finance the interbank market which is the source of all loans. An useful reference is Freixas 
and Rochet (1997), p. 55.
8 The financial institutions selected were both commercial banks, which were able to finance 
themselves by deposits and investment banks, which were not.
9 Reduced form revenue equation means the equation on which the total revenue is a function of 
only variables whose values are considered to be exogenous to the bank's decision.
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•  Proposition 2 (Panzar and Rosse, 1987, p. 452): "For firms observed in long-run 
competitive equilibrium, the sum of the elasticities of reduced form revenues 
with respect to factor prices equals unity.'' (thus, ψ = 1). 
The meaning of Proposition 2 could be interpreted as follows (SHAFFER, 2004): 
in an industry in the long-run competitive equilibrium, all firms are operating at 
the minimum efficient scale. In response to a given increase on input prices, and 
supposing the cost function to be homogeneous of degree one in factor prices, the 
average cost increase will be by the same percentage amount as the original increase 
in input prices. This change in the cost function will lead to entry or exit, giving 
way to a different equilibrium. On this new equilibrium, the quantity demanded 
is unchanged, but the price is not; since companies are producing at the minimum 
average cost on the new cost curve, this means the revenues have increased by the 
same amount. Thus, the effect of an increase in input prices is to bring about an 
increase in total revenue by the same percentage amount.
The Theorem 1 could be understand as follows: in a monopoly equilibrium, 
the quantity supplied is such to equate the marginal revenue to marginal cost. 
Supposing the marginal cost function homogeneous of degree one again, and the 
marginal cost curve to intersect the marginal revenue curve from below, the res-
ponse of a monopolist to an increase in input prices is an increase in marginal cost 
by the same percentage amount as the increase in factor prices, and a decrease in 
quantities. Since marginal revenue is always non-negative in equilibrium, this means 
the total revenue must decrease, implying ψ ≤ 0.
The authors also try to investigate the behavior of this statistic under the assump-
tion of a conjectural variations oligopoly, but they find out the behavior of ψ on this 
case to be indeterminate. The only result these authors derive refers to the effect 
of factor prices on output.10
This methodology has been applied in many settings, besides the applications by 
Araújo et al. (2005) and Belaisch (2003) for the Brazilian banking. Mathisen and 
Buchs (2005) also apply it for the Ghanian financial system, Prasad and Ghosh 
(2005) do the same for the Indian Banking system, Bikker and Raaf (2002) for the 
the european banking sector, among many others.11 Cetorelli (1999) has a short 
survey of the most important methodologies.
10 They found out the sum of elasticites of factor prices on the reduced form output equation is to 
be negative
11 In fact, given the large number of papers which use this methodology, one can safely conclude 
that this is one of the most important methodologies for investigating the degree of competitive-
ness for any given industry, together with the various versions the of Bresnahan (1982) and Lau 
(1982) approach.
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However, this methodology is not exempt of problems. The first one is that the 
results derived by Panzar and Rosse (1987) are found under conditions of long-run 
equilibrium only. If this condition is not verified in practice, the Panzar and Rosse 
statistic has its meaning changed. As Shaffer (1983) have pointed out, in the case 
of short-run equilibrium the test on the ψ statitsic reduces to an one tailed test in 
which a positive value rejects any form of imperfect competition, and a negative 
value is consistent with various possible competitive structures. This test of long-
run competition is usually carried out by investigating the effects of changes in 
input prices on profits. Is these are zero, it is assumed the market is in long-run 
equilibrium.
The second problem is some test results might not discriminate between different 
market structures. As Panzar and Rosse (1987, p. 451) state after deriving the range 
of values consistent with the Chamberlinian oligopoly: 
The range of permissible values for ψ  – i.e., the values for the H 
statistic consistent with Chamberlinian equilibrium – includes 
that of ψ*– the values for the H statistic consistent with 
Monopoly equilibrium – (i.e., the negative real line) plus the unit 
interval. Thus the analyst can, in principle, observe data that are 
consistent with the hypothesis of monopolistic competition but 
not with that of profit maximizing monopoly. 
As Shaffer (1983, 2004) also points out, a value for ψ equal to one could be 
consistent with either a policy of fixed markups or a sales maximization under 
a break-even constant, or even in a market of local natural monopolies under 
contestability.
Another criticism comes from Bikker et al. (2006), which conclude the inclusion 
of scale variables as independent regressors in the Panzar-Rosse test equation tends 
to bias the ψˆ  coefficient upward.
In any case, this methodolgy provides a useful starting point, since this methodolo-
gy doees not require defining the relevant markets, and our application of the test 
is based upon the following regression:
 ln(RTit) = β1ln(AGNit) + β2ln(CRDit) + β3ln(DEPSit) +
 + β4ln(W1it) + β5ln(RDEPSit) + β6ln(W3it) + fi + εit
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In which the term fi denotes the individual effect and the Panzar-Rosse H statistic 
is β4 + β5 + β6. The AGNit variable, defined as in Araújo et al. (2005) as the share 
of bank i in the systemwide number of branches, is related to the "too big to fail'' 
characteristic that some banks present. The CRDit variable, total loans over the sum 
of total deposits and liabilities on loans, was intended as a proxy for intermediation 
risk; and DEPSit, total deposits, tries to capture scale economies.
The RDEPSit, W1it and W3it variables are the input prices in this case (deposits, 
payments to the labor force and remuneration to physical capital), meaning we are 
implicitly adopting the view of the banking firm as of the "Monti-Klein'' model. The 
results are presented both for the full sample, as well as for sub-samples comprising 
only commercial banks, investment banks and sub groups sorted according to size 
(banks with average assets below 250 million Reais, those with assets between 
250 and 5,000 and those with average assets above 5,000 million reais).12 Another 
interesting issue13 is that many mergers happened during this period. In order to 
face the effect of these mergers on the results, the estimates were also carried 
out using only the balanced sample, that is, banks which were present at all time 
periods in our sample.
12 The smaller group comprises banks associated with retailers, smaller brokerage firms and bran-
ches of international groups. The medium sized institutions were banks associated with auto-
makers (such as GM, Volkswagen) and former regional state owned banks. And finally, the largest 
group comprises the largest private banks, as well as Banco do Brasil and CEF, as well as some of 
the larger subnational state owned banks.
13 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
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Table 3 – Regression Results – Deposits as an Input (Top)
  Full Sample  
 Large 
Banks
 
Medium 
Banks
 
 Small 
Banks
 
Commercial 
Banks
 
Investment 
Banks
 
ln(AGNit)  0.082   0.054   0.069   0.244   0.055   0.059  
 (1.730)   (1.254)   (1.802)   (1.983)   (1.203)   (0.660)  
ln(CRDit)  0.066 **  0.007   0.055   0.028   0.078   0.058 * 
 (2.857)   (0.352)   (1.911)   (0.855)   (1.504)   (2.414)  
ln(W1it)  0.152 *  0.023   0.197 ***  0.256 **  0.087   0.308 ***
 (2.547)   (1.420)   (3.838)   (3.059)   (1.830)   (3.549)  
ln(RDEPit)  0.623 ***  0.802 ***  0.712 ***  0.375 ***  0.744 ***  0.513 ***
 (12.470)   (42.371)   (23.732)   (7.159)   (24.961)   (8.317)  
ln(DEPSit)  0.700 ***  0.805 ***  0.811 ***  0.327 ***  0.789 ***  0.614 ***
 (15.064)   (23.325)   (36.054)   (4.983)   (19.170)   (10.450)  
ln(W3it)  0.075 *  0.094 ***  0.043   0.127   0.083 **  0.058  
 (2.524)   (5.770)   (1.970)   (1.549)   (3.173)   (0.937)  
Constant  3.841 ***  3.546 ***  2.091 ***  7.993 ***  3.111 ***  3.590 ** 
 (5.071)   (4.764)   (4.245)   (5.737)   (3.857)   (3.104)  
Number of Obs.  2458   571   1396   491   1332   1126  
R-sq  0.844   0.954   0.918   0.743   0.896   0.815  
Panzar's H Stat  0.850   0.920   0.952   0.758   0.913   0.879  
H=1 (p-value)  0.000   0.000   0.009   0.000   0.000   0.000  
H=0 (p-value)  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
  Full Sample  
 Large 
Banks
 
Medium 
Banks
 
 Small 
Banks
 
Commercial 
Banks
 
Investment 
Banks
 
ln(AGNit)  0.234 **  0.217   0.242 **  0.399   0.179   0.199  
 (3.235)   (1.771)   (2.825)   (1.473)   (1.822)   (1.309)  
ln(CRDit)  0.105 **  0.176 **  0.051   0.096 *  0.078   0.092 * 
 (3.037)   (3.057)   (1.516)   (2.498)   (1.502)   (2.530)  
ln(W1it)  0.353 **  0.175   0.550 ***  0.323 **  0.271 **  0.591 ***
 (3.291)   (1.913)   (6.835)   (3.162)   (2.683)   (5.682)  
ln(DEPSit)  0.586 ***  0.595 ***  0.596 ***  0.350 *  0.499 ***  0.574 ***
 (9.913)   (3.900)   (11.011)   (2.466)   (6.676)   (8.490)  
ln(W3it)  0.144 *  0.339 ***  0.052   0.207 *  0.193 **  0.106  
 (2.567)   (4.159)   (1.279)   (2.154)   (3.141)   (1.337)  
Constant  3.754 **  5.199   2.610 *  7.487 **  5.274 ***  2.301  
 (3.314)   (1.629)   (2.251)   (2.820)   (3.530)   (1.717)  
Number of Obs.  2458   571   1396   491   1332   1126  
R-sq  0.534   0.557   0.593   0.561   0.505   0.590  
Panzar's H Stat  0.497   0.515   0.602   0.529   0.464   0.697  
H=1 (p-value)  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
H=0 (p-value)  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
Obs: Asymptotic t Stats in Parentheses. Codes: P-value<0.01***, P-value<0.05** and P-value<0.1*.
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The robust standard errors are in parentheses, and the table points out some in-
teresting results. The first one is all variables are highly significant and the model 
does present a high explanatory power. And finally, the results for the test of 
competitive structure point out to a Panzar-Rosse H Statistic of 0.8, and both hy-
potheses of ψ = 0 and ψ = 1 are rejected, which should point out to a competitive 
structure of Chamberlinian oligopoly, if the market is shown to be in long-run 
equilibrium. The results are qualitatively similar for each subsample, in which both 
hypotheses ψ = 0 and ψ = 1 are rejected.
Two other alternatives were tried, in order to face the criticisms posed by Bikker 
et al. (2006) about the inclusion of scale variables as explanatory variables. In one 
alternative, the ln(DEPSit) variable was dropped from the estimating equations and 
in the other alternative both ln(DEPSit) and ln(AGNit) were dropped. In both alter-
natives the estimated ψ statistics were higher than at the previous table, at odds 
to the expected bias described by Bikker et al. (2006); furthermore, the resulting 
decrease in explanatory power, in some cases, led us to not reject the perfect com-
petition hypothesis.
The test was also carried out assuming deposits are not inputs to the banking firm, 
and the results – which also point out to a rejection of both hypotheses of perfect 
competition and monopoly – are presented on the bottom panel of Table 3.
Since the results do not seem to be driven by the behavior of any subgroup in our 
sample neither by scale effects bias such as pointed out by Bikker et al. (2006), the 
next step was to investigate of the markets can be considered in Long-Run equi-
librium. The usual test for this hypothesis, as discussed before, involves the sum 
of elasticities of factor prices with respect to companies' profits. This test will be 
carried out by using the following specification
 ln(RTit – Cit) = β1ln(AGNit) + β2ln(CRDit) + β3ln(DEPSit) +
 + β4ln(W1it) + β5ln(RDEPSit) + β6ln(W3it) + fi + εit
This profit tests for the complete sample and the subsamples discussed previously 
are on the following table. Alternative specifications without the ln(DEPSit) and 
ln(AGNit) were also tried in order to compare the results to the versions of the 
Panzar-Rosse test, and also alternatives which do not assume deposits to be inputs 
to the banking firm (on the bottom panel of Table 4):
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Table 4 – Profit Test – Deposits as an Input (Top)
  Full Sample  
 Large 
Banks
 
Medium 
Banks
 
 Small 
Banks
 
Commercial 
Banks
 
Investment 
Banks
 
ln(AGNit)  0.411 *  0.187   0.475 **  0.439   0.448 *  0.223  
 (2.454)   (0.464)   (2.699)   (0.846)  (2.175)   (0.835)  
ln(CRDit)  0.056   -0.029   0.054   0.022   0.009   0.068  
 (1.303)   (-0.197)   (0.922)   (0.334)  (0.088)   (1.872)  
ln(W1it)  0.074   -0.014   0.110   0.270   0.045   0.151  
 (1.158)   (-0.554)   (1.128)   (1.296)  (0.716)   (0.964)  
ln(RDEPit)  0.487 ***  0.490 **  0.502 ***  0.485 ***  0.448 ***  0.543 ***
 (10.064)   (2.733)   (8.623)   (4.811)  (5.330)   (8.318)  
ln(DEPSit)  0.430 ***  0.674   0.506 ***  0.076   0.500 ***  0.318 ***
 (5.725)   (1.806)   (5.716)   (0.481)  (3.560)   (3.631)  
ln(W3it)  0.163 **  0.256 *  0.147 **  0.036   0.221 ***  0.056  
 (3.169)   (2.203)   (2.647)   (0.172)  (3.523)   (0.414)  
Constant  8.112 ***  3.461   7.450 ***  11.136 *  7.485 **  7.666 ** 
 (4.405)   (0.445)   (3.985)   (2.135)  (2.736)   (2.969)  
Number of Obs.  2458   571   1396   491   1332   1126  
R-sq  0.202   0.170   0.237   0.206   0.179   0.228  
Test Stat  0.725   0.733   0.759   0.791   0.715   0.750  
H=0 (p-value)  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
  Full Sample  
 Large 
Banks
 
Medium 
Banks
 
 Small 
Banks
 
Commercial 
Banks
 
Investment 
Banks
 
ln(AGNit)  0.530 **  0.287   0.597 **  0.640   0.522 *  0.371  
 (2.966)   (0.748)   (3.197)  (0.993)   (2.486)  (1.071)  
ln(CRDit)  0.086 *  0.074   0.051   0.109   0.009   0.104 * 
 (2.026)   (0.628)   (0.807)  (1.778)   (0.088)  (2.509)  
ln(W1it)  0.231 *  0.079   0.359 ***  0.356   0.157   0.450 ** 
 (2.463)   (1.331)   (3.438)  (1.645)   (1.796)  (2.769)  
ln(DEPSit)  0.341 ***  0.546   0.355 ***  0.106   0.324 *  0.276 * 
 (3.906)   (1.388)   (3.577)  (0.493)   (2.203)  (2.630)  
ln(W3it)  0.217 ***  0.406 ***  0.154 *  0.139   0.288 ***  0.107  
 (3.479)   (4.219)   (2.585)  (0.616)   (4.383)  (0.714)  
Constant  8.043 ***  4.472   7.816 ***  10.482   8.789 **  6.301  
 (3.860)   (0.537)   (3.639)  (1.587)   (2.944)  (1.973)  
Number of Obs.  2458   571   1396   491   1332   1126  
R-sq  0.132   0.130   0.165   0.120   0.135   0.123  
Test Stat  0.448   0.486   0.512   0.495   0.444   0.557  
H=0 (p-value)  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
Obs: Asymptotic t Stats in Parentheses. Codes: P-value<0.01 ***, P-value<0.05 ** and value<0.1.
The previous result point to a rejection of the hypothesis at one percent significance 
level the observed data is consistent with long-run equilibrium behavior, indicating 
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the rather restrictive assumptions required for the usage of Panzar-Rosse statistic as 
a competition test are soundly rejected. For the balanced sample, the results were 
qualitatively similar, pointing out to the rejection of the underlying assumptions of 
the Panzar-Rosse test. This conclusion also obtained when the scale variables are 
removed from the test equation for a comparison with the test in accordance to the 
conclusions of Bikker et al. (2006).
The importance of this fact must not be underestimated, since all previous tests 
using the Panzar-Rosse methodology did not present the results of the long run 
equilibrium test, putting in check the conslusions raised by both Araújo et al. 
(2005) and Belaisch (2003) concerning the competitive structure of this industry. 
As for the constructive conclusions of the tests above, one is only able to reject 
the hypothesis of a joint profit maximizing oligopoly (that is, cartel behavior) by 
Brazilian banks. However, for more specific conclusions regarding the characteri-
zation of competition, a different approach must be tried, the theme of the next 
section.
3.2 The conjectural variations approach
On this section, an alternative approach is explored to identify the competitive 
conduct, in which the relevant parameters are understood to reflect the firms' 
"expectations'' about the reaction of their competitors to increased output. More 
specifically, the version of Gollop and Roberts (1979) presented in the analysis of 
Spanish banking by Moreno, Martínez and Ruiz (2006) was developed here.
Their model begins by posing an inverse demand function for loans:
 Rt  = D(∑iCREDSit)
In which D'(⋅)<0, and indicates the market opportunity cost of credit – Rt at the 
time period t – is a decreasing function of the aggregate volume of loans, the sum 
of CREDSit14 at time period t over all banks denoted i. The lending rate for an in-
dividual bank could be expressed as the sum of the opportunity cost of funds, Rt, 
and a bank specific variable which collects the differences in service quality. In a 
sense, the vit variable could be understood as capturing the product differentiation 
aspects of the banking services. Thus, the loan rate charged by each bank could be 
written as:
 RCREDit  = Rt + vit 
 RCREDit  = D(∑iCREDSit) + vit
14 The i subscripts refer to individual banks.
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The cost function, on the other hand, could be separated on the following way:
 Cit  = Zit × CREDSit  + c(CREDSit, DEPSit, W1it, W3it)
On the previous equation, Zit is defined as the interbank rate under which additional 
funds could also be borrowed in order to increase lending. The c(⋅) function repre-
sent the operating costs, depending on factor prices (labor and capital), as well as 
on scale of loans and deposits. From the definition of economic profit, substitution 
of the cost function defined previously leads to:
 Πi = (RCREDit  – Zit) × CREDSit  – c(DEPSit, W1it, W3it)
Assuming the strategic variable for banks is the volume of loans, differentiation of 
the profit function with respect to CREDSit leads to, after reorganization:
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of demand with respect to credit rate – 
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15 is also known as the conjectural variation expected by bank i (that 
is, the sum of expected changes on the quantity supplied by the firms' competitors 
in response to a change on its own quantity).16 Usually not enough degrees of fre-
edom for estimating each conjectural variation were available, and it is proposed 
here a technique to reduce the number of coefficients to be estimated.17 It is im-
portant to emphasize, though, that despite the different name, this conjectural 
variation is the same thing as the conduct parameter discussed above.
The technique proposed involves rewriting the summation above in terms of s di-
fferent groups, defined by their size (less than 250 milllion BRL in assets, between 
15 An important result in the analysis is 
ktkt k i
k i
it it
CREDSCREDS
CREDS CREDS
≠
≠
∂∂ =
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∑∑
16 Recent criticisms of the concept of conduct parameter include Corts (1998), which indicate any 
structural change in demand and supply variables would make the identification assumptions 
suspect. Furthermore, Wolfram (1999), Corts (1998) and Puller (2007)  conclude the test might 
only be used to discriminate between competition, collusion and Cournot Equilibrium. Even so, 
this diminished interpretation of the conduct parameter is an improvement over the results of 
the previous section.
17 Nevo (1998) makes a related point regarding the identification of conduct parameters in such 
situations, for which he advocates using tests of non-nested hypotheses.
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250 and 5,000 million and above 5,000 million in assets) leading to the following 
equation: 
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This equation expressing the conjectural variation can be rewritten in relative 
terms: 
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CREDS
CREDS
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∂
∑  would be the relative conjectural variation, the expec-
ted percentage response to an one million BRL in credit supply by bank i. However, 
the imposition of a same conjecture for every firm in each category implies that 
banks closer to each other, but belonging to different groups might possess very 
different conjectures (GOLLOP; ROBERTS, 1979, p. 316). The solution presented 
by Gollop and Roberts (1979) and adopted by Moreno, Martínez and Ruiz (2006) 
was to select some firms as benchmarks. The conjectural variation of each firm 
with respect to each group will be a weighted average of the conjectural variations 
for each of the benchmarks.
Thus, the term ( ),ln ktk h k i
it
CREDS
CREDS
∈ ≠
∂
∂
∑ is a parameter to be estimated, jhβ , in which j is 
an array composed of two elements – Top or Bottom and the group number. The h 
is the group to which the reaction refers, so the term 1
1
Tβ  means the response of 
the largest firm on the first group to changes in the CREDS variable of the compa-
nies in the first group.
For a firm i located between the benchmarks j-1 and j, the (1 )i Li Tih i h i hw wβ = β + − β , 
in which Lihβ  and 
Ti
hβ  are the conjectures of the smallest and largest firms in which 
bank i is classified. The Wi, on the other hand, is a measure of the distance between 
i firm and the smallest firm in the group. Thus, the previous equation can be 
rewritten as: 
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In order to estimate this model, two other points must be addressed. The first one 
relates to the fact the market shares – the Sit variable – and margins are simulta-
neously determined. This problem was faced by specifying a reduced form equation 
for the market share of bank i, presented below:
 Sit = ψ0 + ψ1CR3SHAREit  + ψ2Yit  + ψ3ASSEM Pit (2)
The other problem is the marginal cost usually is not directly observed (studies 
such as of Wolfram (1999)which had quite reliable independent estimates of mar-
ginal costs are quite rare). Even considering accounting data, one of the most im-
portant characteristics of the New Empirical Industrial Organization models is 
that marginal cost is not an observable quantity. The cost side of the firms was 
modeled using a translog specification combined with the input relations derived 
from Shepard's Lemma. Considering a view of the banking firm in which it provides 
two services – deposits and credits – and demanding two factors, labor and physical 
capital, the following system of equations is the cost side of the model: 
0 1 2 3
2 2
4 5 1 2
2 2
3 4 5
1 2
ln ln ln ln ln
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CREDS W CREDS
= α + α + α + α × +
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) ln( 3 ) ln( ) ln( 1 )
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1 4 3 1 31 ln( 1 ) ln( 3 ) ln( ) ln( )it it it it itSU W W CREDS DEPS= γ + γ + γ + δ + δ  (4)
2 5 3 2 43 ln( 3 ) ln( 1 ) ln( ) ln( )it it it it itSU W W CREDS DEPS= γ + γ + γ + δ + δ  (5)
The system of equations (3)-(5), which the SU1 and SU2 variables are the shares of 
labor and physical capital in total costs, imply the marginal cost of credits as being:
( )1 3 4 1 2ln ln( ) ln( 1 ) ln( 3 )itit it it it it
it
CCMg DEPS CREDS W W
CREDS
= α + α + α + δ + δ  (6)
The empirical analysis was carried out in two steps; on the first one the system of 
equations 3-5 was estimated, and with the coefficients the predicted marginal costs 
were computed using equation (6). With the predicted marginal costs, the system 
1-2 was estimated.18 The estimation method used was the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions system, and the results are on the following tables:
18 The equation (1) was estimated by expanding the parentheses and the vit variable was approxi-
mated by the ratio of workers per branch, the QUALit variable.
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Table 5 – System of Equations (3)-(5)
  Restr.   No Restr.   Restr.   No Restr.  
Eqn. 3         
ln(DEPSit)  0.065   1.322 ***  1.794 ***  2.204 ***
 (0.222)   (4.043)   (3.573)   (4.232)  
ln(CREDSit)  0.744 *  -0.733   -2.641 ***  -3.177 ***
 (2.091)   (-1.868)   (-4.298)   (-5.013)  (ln(DEPSit))2  0.368 ***  0.327 ***  0.345 ***  0.248 ***
 (7.553)   (6.183)   (5.598)   (3.819)  (ln(CREDSit))2  0.170 *  0.203 *  0.555 ***  0.423 ** 
 (1.993)   (2.267)   (4.328)   (3.157)  
ln(DEPSit)×ln(CREDSit)  -0.263 ***  -0.245 ***  -0.390 ***  -0.265 ** 
 (-4.137)   (-3.618)   (-4.373)   (-2.817)  
ln(W1it)  0.538 ***  1.014 ***  0.557 ***  0.831 ***
 (25.647)   (14.137)   (16.118)   (8.305)  
ln(W3it)  0.462 ***  -0.014   0.443 ***  0.169  
 (22.064)   (-0.189)   (12.795)   (1.688)  (ln(W1it))2  -0.076 ***  -0.035 ***  -0.014 ***  -0.002  
 (-53.429)   (-12.357)   (-11.973)   (-0.874)  (ln(W3it))2  0.119 ***  0.119 ***  0.030 ***  0.033 ***
 (107.589)   (36.504)   (23.976)   (9.186)  
ln(W1it)×ln(W3it)  -0.044 ***  -0.084 ***  -0.016 ***  -0.031 ***
 (-28.465)   (-29.227)   (-15.171)   (-9.416)  
ln(W1it)×ln(DEPSit)  -0.131 ***  -0.421 ***  -0.113 ***  -0.343 ***
 (-15.380)   (-15.376)   (-14.260)   (-12.302)  
ln(W1it)×ln(CREDSit)  0.125 ***  0.372 ***  0.104 ***  0.310 ***
 (13.837)   (12.746)   (12.071)   (10.301)  
ln(W3it)×ln(DEPSit)  -0.071 ***  -0.099 ***  -0.097 ***  -0.060 ** 
 (-9.932)   (-7.288)   (-11.309)   (-2.713)  
ln(W3it)×ln(CREDSit)  0.077 ***  0.148 ***  0.106 ***  0.093 ***
 (10.010)   (9.225)   (11.557)   (3.746)  
Constant  -2.190 **  -1.746 *  10.226 ***  10.858 ***
 (-3.258)   (-2.429)   (5.345)   (5.350)  
Eqn. 4         
ln(W1it)  -0.076 ***  -0.007 ***  -0.014 ***  -0.002  
 (-53.429)   (-4.840)   (-11.973)   (-1.327)  
ln(W3it)  -0.044 ***  0.004 **  -0.016 ***  -0.010 ***
 (-28.465)   (2.823)   (-15.171)   (-7.732)  
ln(DEPSit)  -0.131 ***  -0.041 ***  -0.113 ***  -0.057 ***
 (-15.380)   (-9.144)   (-14.260)   (-10.267)  
ln(CREDSit)  0.125 ***  0.034 ***  0.104 ***  0.019 ** 
 (13.837)   (6.888)   (12.071)   (2.875)  
Constant  0.538 ***  0.254 ***  0.557 ***  0.620 ***
 (25.647)   (15.828)   (16.118)   (14.455)  
Eqn. 5         
ln(W1it)  -0.044 ***  -0.006 ***  -0.016 ***  -0.009 ***
 (-28.465)   (-3.531)   (-15.171)   (-5.707)  
ln(W3it)  0.119 ***  0.036 ***  0.030 ***  0.015 ***
 (107.589)   (21.319)   (23.976)   (7.859)  
ln(DEPSit)  -0.071 ***  0.023 ***  -0.097 ***  -0.056 ***
 (-9.932)   (4.612)   (-11.309)   (-7.217)  
ln(CREDSit)  0.077 ***  -0.048 ***  0.106 ***  0.035 ***
 (10.010)   (-8.694)   (11.557)   (3.723)  
Constant  0.462 ***  0.593 ***  0.443 ***  0.424 ***
 (22.064)   (32.888)   (12.795)   (7.085)  
Bank Fixed Effects  No   No   Yes   Yes  
Number of Obs.  2458   2458   2458   2458  
R-sq 1st eqn.  0.863   0.885   0.942   0.946  
R-sq 2nd eqn.  -1.904   0.078   0.697   0.819  
R-sq 3rd eqn.  -0.759   0.336   0.706   0.800  
Obs:  Asymptotic t Stats in Parentheses. Codes: P-value<0.01 ***, P-value<0.05 ** and 
P-value<0.1.
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The cost side equation was estimated in four different ways, depending if the cross-
equation restrictions were imposed19 and whether firm specific effects were tried, 
leading to the four versions presented in the previous page. As a further check on 
the economic plausibility of the results, the implied markups over marginal costs 
were computed and the distribution is as follows:20
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Figure 1 – Distribution of Markups
19 The homogeneity and symmetry restrictions, δ = 0, γ3 + γ4 + γ5 = 0 and γ1 + γ2 = 1, were imposed 
in all alternatives.
20 An important point is related to the estimation of the price elasticity of demand. The approach 
pursued here was based on Shaffer (1993) and starts by posing the following demand function 
for banking services – understood as banking assets:
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
10
it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it
it it dit
Q a a P a Y a QUAL a Z a P Y
a P Z a P QUAL a Y Z a Y QUAL
a Z QUAL
= + + + + + × +
+ × + × + × + × +
+ × + ε
 (7)
 In this demand function, Zit is considered a measure of price of substitutes – since we are con-
sidering the sole output of the banking firm as their assets, this should be analugous to the op-
portunity cost of internally generated funds for the firm which demands credits. On the other 
hand both Yit (proxy for income) and QUALit (proxy for quality of services) are demand shifters. 
The model implied is estimated by Three-Stages Least squares, with a pricing equation. 
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The estimated markups obtained after imposing the symmetry and homogeneity 
tended to present similar averages to the estimates without such restrictions, and 
lower variance of markups.21 Given the estimates of the marginal costs, the pricing 
side of the model could be estimated. Due to problems of multicollinearity, the 
conduct parameters were estimated in a way only the expected responses of the 
largest firm on the sample were estimated directly and the other responses were 
computed as differences:
Table 6 – System of Equations 1-2
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4  
Eqn. 1         
1 1
1 1
L Tβ − β  -1.835   -1.817   -1.909   -1.862  
 (-1.717)   (-1.695)   (-1.782)   (-1.729)  
1
1
Tβ  1.926 **  1.910 **  1.969 **  1.939 ** 
 (2.853)   (2.821)   (2.912)   (2.850)  
1 2
1 1
T Tβ + β  -1.899 **  -1.883 **  -1.942 **  -1.911 ** 
 (-2.813)   (-2.781)   (-2.871)   (-2.810)  
1 3
1 1
T Tβ + β  -1.926 **  -1.911 **  -1.970 **  -1.939 ** 
 (-2.854)   (-2.822)   (-2.912)   (-2.851)  
1 1
2 2
L Tβ − β  0.030   0.030   0.030   0.030  
 (1.609)   (1.594)   (1.593)   (1.572)  
1
2
Tβ  -0.028 *  -0.028 *  -0.028 *  -0.028 * 
 (-2.522)   (-2.506)   (-2.485)   (-2.466)  
1 2
2 2
T Tβ + β  0.028 *  0.027 *  0.027 *  0.027 * 
 (2.482)   (2.466)   (2.446)   (2.426)  
1 3
2 2
T Tβ + β  0.028 *  0.028 *  0.027 *  0.027 * 
 (2.503)   (2.488)   (2.467)   (2.447)  
1 1
3 3
L Tβ − β  0.002   0.002   0.002   0.002  
 (0.487)   (0.479)   (0.536)   (0.511)  
1
3
Tβ  -0.005 *  -0.005 *  -0.005 *  -0.005 * 
 (-2.059)   (-2.039)   (-2.104)   (-2.065)  
1 2
3 3
T T+β β  0.004 *  0.004 *  0.005 *  0.005 * 
 (2.015)   (1.994)   (2.059)   (2.020)  
1 3
3 3
T T+β β  0.005 *  0.005 *  0.005 *  0.005 * 
 (2.054)   (2.033)   (2.099)   (2.060)  
2 2
1 1
L Tβ − β  -0.051 ***  -0.051 ***  -0.052 ***  -0.052 ***
 (-3.765)   (-3.760)   (-3.780)   (-3.774)  
2 2
2 2
L Tβ − β  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
 (1.383)   (1.406)   (1.331)   (1.357)  
2 2
3 3
L Tβ − β  0.000 ***  0.000 ***  0.000 ***  0.000 ***
 (3.536)   (3.491)   (3.619)   (3.569)  
3 3
1 1
L Tβ − β  0.003   0.003   0.003   0.003  
 (1.698)   (1.716)   (1.760)   (1.773)  
3 3
2 2
L Tβ − β  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
 (0.147)   (0.167)   (0.169)   (0.183)  
3 3
3 3
L Tβ − β  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
 (0.766)   (0.738)   (0.750)   (0.725)  
Eqn. 2         
CR3SHAREit  0.046 *  0.046 *  0.046 *  0.046 * 
 (2.175)   (2.177)   (2.169)   (2.168)  
Yit  -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000  
 (-1.189)   (-1.170)   (-1.151)   (-1.143)  
ASSEMPit  -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000  
 (-0.480)   (-0.448)   (-0.489)   (-0.459)  
Constant  0.004   0.003   0.003   0.003  
 (0.241)   (0.227)   (0.213)   (0.210)  
Number of Obs.  2458   2458   2458   2458  
R-sq 1st eqn.  0.395   0.395   0.401   0.400  
R-sq 2nd eqn.  -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   -0.002  
Obs: Asymptotic t Stats in Parentheses. Codes: P-value<0.01 ***, P-value<0.05 ** and P-value<0.1 *.
21 As for the values of the markups, Genesove e Mullin (1998) report that differences in estimated 
costs tend to have little effect on the estimated conduct parameter, which is the main thrust of 
this paper.
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For the Model 1, without fixed effects and restrictions, the estimated conduct 
parameters for a given quarter and their confidence intervals are presented on the 
following figure:22
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Figure 2 – Estimated Conduct Parameter – 2005/4
Some interesting results in this figure can be inferred. The first one is that there 
is a great difference between the observed conjectural variations – and by virtue of 
its definition, also their conduct parameters – for each group. Each of the graphs 
in the previous table present the response of the reference banks (smallest (L) and 
largest (T)) with respect to increases in loans by banks in each group.
The resulys in the table point out to firms in group 1 expect an aggressive response 
by banks in their own group, with their competitors in this group increasing their 
loan output in response to an increased output, further depressing loan rates. On 
the other hand, banks in groups 2 and 3 expect a more cooperative response of 
banks in group 1 to increases in their own output. Banks in group 1 will decrease 
22 Results for the other models – quite similar to the ones presented here – are presented on the 
Appendix A.
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their output in response to increases in loan output by banks in groups 2 and 3, kee-
ping the loan rate to decrease further. And finally, in the largest group of banks, the 
companies expect a cooperative response of their competitors in the same group, 
reducing their loans after an increase of output by one of them. This also keeps the 
loan rate from falling.
The estimated conduct parameters, on the other hand, do not lend themselves to 
an easy mapping to any of the static oligopoly solutions known on the literature. 
For instance, the standard Cournot oligopoly result would imply firms to react ac-
cording to changes in market supply but not according to the source of the change. 
This implies firms of different sizes have same expectations of relative responses 
of rivals – according to Gollop and Roberts (1979), p. 322 –, or all β to be the same 
and equal to zero, which inspection of the figure above indicates is not the case.
The adequacy of the standard conduct parameter – the approaches of Bresnahan 
(1982) and Lau (1982) – can also be tested, by the hypothesis all β to be equal, 
though not necessarily zero, which is also rejected.
Even though the exact competitive assumptions are not revealed by these results, 
they also point out to another weakness of the Panzar-Rosse (1987) result, which 
relies on the equality of conduct parameters between firms.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we tried to review existing tests for competition in the Brazilian 
banking system and propose some alternatives. The first step in the analysis was 
to describe the institutional changes after the decrease in inflation rates brought 
about by the Real Plan in 1994. After the description of the institutional setting of 
the Brazilian Banking system on this period, the competition tests on the literature 
were reviewed, beginning with the test proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). The 
market did not seem to be in long-run equilibrium, allowing us to conclude nothing 
else but the market does not seem to find itself in a collusive outcome. This result 
proved quite robust to different samples, different specifications and definition of 
inputs of the banking firm.
A new methodology was presented next, based on Gollop and Roberts (1979) and 
applied by Moreno, Martínez and Ruiz (2006) for the Spanish banking market. 
On this methodology, in which the assumption of equality of conduct parameters 
between firms and time periods is relaxed, and is also adopted a different view of 
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the input-output structure of the banking firm. The results indicate that, for some 
firms and in some time periods, a cooperative conduct in fact is present.
All these results point out to a rather limited applicability of the Panzar-Rosse sta-
tistic in the Brazilian banking sector, both because of the equilibrium assumptions 
– which were not verified – as well as the noted heterogeneity of the expected com-
petitive responses by firms in this market. Both results cast doubt in the eventual 
lack of competition found in the sector.
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Appendix A
Table A1 – Descriptive Statistics
Variable Code Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
v7  2458  11,500,000  33,700,000  21,897  261,000,000 
v13  2458  3,481,204  10,500,000  3.3042  109,000,000 
v14  2458  -248,419  809,059  -7,745,116  0.0000 
v17  2458  222,831  849,331  -2557.9310  14,400,000 
v18  2458  411,815  1,488,009  92.3231  14,700,000 
p7  2458  10,500,000  31,300,000  669.0000  248,000,000 
p13  2458  4,606,502  16,000,000  0.0000  138,000,000 
p18  2458  1,381,056  3,609,167  0.0000  27,700,000 
d13  2458  4,606,502  16,000,000  0.0000  138,000,000 
l7  2458  108,040  407,315  0.0000  3,953,364 
l8  2458  -118,770  421,628  -4,937,046  0.0000 
l9  2458  -121,870  388,150  -3,019,480  -110.2011 
l10  2458  -26,218  84,270  -886,142  -8.0000 
l12  2458  91,272  384,675  0.0000  6,827,962 
l13  2458  -84,824  314,316  -4,542,411  0.0000 
l15  2458  3,232  46,757  -573,807  996,663 
l20  2458  4,186  15,111  1.0000  109,756 
l21  2458  146  509  1.0000  4,008 
r7  2458  403,975  1,205,036  -2,697  11,000,000 
r8  2458  304,117  915,436  -231,605  11,100,000 
r9  2458  375  186,007  -2,160,811  1,773,772 
r10  2458  35,850  225,978  0.0000  6,373,477 
r11  2458  28,147  165,252  -242,481  2,887,684 
r12  2458  -321,752  979,165  -10,700,000  0.0000 
r13  2458  -108,423  437,195  -8,399,907  0.0000 
r14  2458  -31,984  116,265  -1,871,072  0.0000 
r15  2458  -3,480  34,711  -1,295,229  0.0000 
r16  2458  -56,520  218,456  -2,923,509  140,586 
TOTALit  2458  17,240  470.1988  16,395  18,075 
AGNit  2458  0.0084  0.0293  0.0001  0.2233 
CRDit  2458  34.2769  652.4069  0.0000  20,744 
W1it  2458  188  1,684  0.0000  43,725 
RDEPit  2458  0.0518  0.0926  0.0002  2.3991 
W3it  2458  1.1783  10.1472  0.0009  463 
RTit  2458  975,008  2,921,469  916.4088  30,000,000 
DEPSit  2458  15,100,000  47,000,000  875  374,000,000 
Yit  2458  472,757  23,457  416,213  521,855 
Qit  2458  11,500,000  33,700,000  21,897  261,000,000 
Pit  2458  0.0893  0.0658  0.0052  1.7100 
Zit  2458  1.4402  0.1941  1.1795  1.8979 
NPit  2458  0.0226  0.0302  0.0000  0.5820 
QUALit  2458  55.5622  67.3705  0.1111  530 
Cit  2458  873,839  2,662,558  226.2021  29,200,000 
CREDSit  2458  10,100,000  28,800,000  18,735  242,000,000 
RCREDit  2458  0.1154  0.1185  0.0075  4.4769 
SHAREit  2458  0.0083  0.0240  0.0000  0.2072 
CR3it  2458  0.3992  0.0236  0.3451  0.4434 
ASSEMPit  2458  44,991  352,693  378.2754  7,493,059 
SU1it  2458  0.1258  0.1040  0.0000  1.2718 
SU2it  2458  0.1788  0.1371  0.0061  1.3067 
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Table A2 – Estimated Conduct Paramaters
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1
1
Lβ  0.091  0.093  0.061  0.077 
SE( 11Lβ )  0.564  0.566  0.565  0.568 
1
1
Tβ  1.926  1.910  1.969  1.939 
SE( 11Tβ )  0.675  0.677  0.676  0.680 
1
2
Lβ   0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
SE( 12Lβ )  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.010 
1
2
Tβ  -0.028  -0.028  -0.028  -0.028 
SE( 12Tβ )  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011 
1
3
Lβ   -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
SE( 13Lβ )  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
1
3
Tβ   -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 
SE( 13Tβ )  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
2
1
Lβ  -3.876  -3.845  -3.963  -3.902 
SE( 21Lβ )  1.350  1.354  1.353  1.360 
2
1
Tβ   -3.825  -3.793  -3.911  -3.850 
SE( 21Tβ )  1.350  1.354  1.353  1.360 
2
2
Lβ   0.056  0.056  0.055  0.055 
SE( 22Lβ )  0.022  0.022  0.022  0.022 
2
2
Tβ   0.056  0.055  0.055  0.055 
SE( 22Tβ )  0.022  0.022  0.022  0.022 
2
3
Lβ  0.056  0.056  0.055  0.055 
SE( 23Lβ )  0.022  0.022  0.022  0.022 
2
3
Tβ   0.056  0.056  0.055  0.055 
SE( 23Tβ )  0.022  0.022  0.022  0.022 
3
1
Lβ   -3.850  -3.818  -3.936  -3.875 
SE( 31Lβ )  1.350  1.354  1.353  1.360 
3
1
Tβ  -3.852  -3.821  -3.939  -3.878 
SE( 31Tβ )  1.350  1.354  1.353  1.360 
3
2
Lβ  0.056  0.056  0.055  0.055 
SE( 32Lβ )  0.022  0.022  0.022  0.022 
3
2
Tβ   0.056  0.056  0.055  0.055 
SE( 32Tβ )  0.022  0.022  0.022  0.022 
3
3
Lβ   -3.852  -3.821  -3.939  -3.878 
SE( 33Lβ )  1.350  1.354  1.353  1.360 
3
3
Tβ   -3.852  -3.821  -3.939  -3.878 
SE( 33Tβ )  1.350  1.354  1.353  1.360 
